The recent disruption of an undersea fiber-optic cable between the Philippines and Singapore has exposed vulnerabilities in the country’s Internet infrastructure, prompting a technology executive to call for more submarine cables, geographically dispersed landing stations, and stronger government protection of critical connectivity facilities.
In a Facebook post, tech veteran Fernando Contreras Jr., former president of the Philippine Internet Services Organization (PISO), said the incident, which affected several major websites, online platforms, and companies, highlighted the country’s dependence on physical telecommunications infrastructure that remains susceptible to natural disasters, equipment failures, and deliberate attacks.
Although connectivity was restored relatively quickly, Contreras warned that a more serious disruption involving multiple submarine cable systems could have far-reaching consequences for the Philippine economy, public services, and national security.
He said the Philippines currently has approximately 11 active international submarine cable systems, depending on how operational and regional networks are classified.
Several of these systems have landing facilities concentrated in Batangas, Cavite, and La Union, while other landing locations include Quezon, Daet in Camarines Norte, Davao, and Claveria in Cagayan.
According to Contreras, the geographic concentration of these facilities creates potential common points of failure, particularly during major earthquakes, submarine landslides, coastal disasters, or deliberate attacks.
“Having several cables does not necessarily mean genuine redundancy if they share the same geographic vulnerabilities,” he said.
Contreras stressed that submarine cable landing stations should be treated as strategic national infrastructure rather than ordinary telecommunications facilities.
Recalling his early career as a trainee at Online/HP, he cited a cable landing facility operated by Eastern Telecoms in Currimao, Ilocos Norte, which was secured by the Armed Forces of the Philippines even before the Internet became widely available.
At the time, the facility supported international telecommunications services, including voice calls, telex, and telegram transmissions.
He said the experience demonstrated that telecommunications infrastructure had long been recognized as a national security concern, a consideration that has become even more important as the economy increasingly depends on digital connectivity.
Contreras said the Philippines needs to expand both its international and domestic submarine cable networks while ensuring that new infrastructure does not share the same geographic vulnerabilities as existing systems.
As an archipelago of more than 7,600 islands, the country faces particularly complex connectivity challenges that require independent backup routes and more widely distributed landing stations, he noted.
He cited Indonesia as a comparison, saying industry inventories have identified as many as 72 submarine cable systems in the neighboring archipelagic country, consisting of 42 domestic and 30 international systems, although he acknowledged that the current operational figures would need verification.
The objective, he said, should not simply be to match another country’s cable count but to establish sufficient network capacity, diversity, and resilience.
“Redundancy is not just having another cable. It is ensuring that the backup cable will not fail from the same incident,” Contreras said.
He also emphasized the importance of Internet Exchanges (IXs), which allow telecommunications networks and Internet service providers to exchange traffic directly, reducing the need to route domestic data through international networks.
Such facilities can help maintain local connectivity even when international submarine cables experience disruptions.
Contreras pointed out that Internet Exchanges and data centers serve different functions and should not be considered interchangeable components of the country’s digital infrastructure.
He also acknowledged the growing role of satellite Internet services such as Starlink, particularly in remote communities and during emergencies.
However, he said satellite connectivity cannot replace submarine fiber-optic cables in carrying the enormous volumes of data required by national telecommunications networks.
In terms of capacity, bandwidth, cost efficiency, and consistently low latency at scale, submarine cables remain the backbone of international connectivity, he said.
Contreras also identified investment costs, regulatory requirements, and permitting procedures as continuing obstacles to the development of additional submarine cable systems.
Such projects require substantial capital, international coordination, specialized vessels, regulatory approvals, and long-term maintenance commitments.
He noted that constitutional restrictions on foreign ownership of public utilities had historically complicated investment in certain telecommunications infrastructure, although recent regulatory reforms have opened additional opportunities.
Turning to government policy, Contreras questioned whether the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) was giving sufficient attention to strengthening the country’s underlying Internet infrastructure.
“Instead of focusing disproportionately on reactive website blocking and content restrictions, shouldn’t the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) be giving greater priority to strengthening our national Internet infrastructure?” he asked.
He urged the DICT, National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), Congress, telecommunications operators, and other industry stakeholders to assess whether the country has sufficient geographically diverse cable landing points and whether domestic networks can continue operating during major international cable failures.
He also called for stronger protection of cable landing stations against natural disasters and sabotage, more Internet Exchange infrastructure to keep domestic traffic within the Philippines, and a coordinated national contingency plan for simultaneous submarine cable disruptions.
Contreras proposed that Congress consider enacting a National Digital Infrastructure Resilience Act to establish long-term policies covering submarine cable development, infrastructure protection, geographic redundancy, emergency restoration, and investment incentives.
Such legislation, he said, should strengthen coordination among government agencies, private telecommunications operators, international cable consortia, and national security institutions.
He warned that Internet connectivity should no longer be viewed solely in terms of download speeds, subscription costs, and mobile network coverage.
Banking systems, government services, hospitals, schools, businesses, and national security operations increasingly rely on telecommunications networks that must remain operational during emergencies.
“Internet resilience is not simply a telecommunications issue. It is an economic, public safety, and national security imperative,” Contreras said.
He urged the government to act before the country experiences a major, prolonged nationwide outage.
“We need to build more than a faster Internet. We need to build an Internet that can survive disruption,” he concluded.
